

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 10, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRUCE CLARKE

FROM: Larry Lynn *LL*

SUBJECT: Your Memo of April 9, 1969

The paper enclosed with your memorandum of April 9 is quite interesting and helpful. It raises a number of questions.

1. The discussion on p. 14, paragraph 17 refers to Major General Prokhorov's views on modeling strategic exchanges. Do we know anymore about the significance of this kind of development? Might he be the Glenn Kent of the Soviet Union? Is there any evidence that analytical thinking affects the views of key military or civilian officials as it did McNamara? What do we know about the priorities they may use in their strategic war planning and targeting? Do different parts of the military bureaucracy have identifiable views about the strategic balance and criteria for force sizing and if so, do they differ?

2. The discussion on p. 15 refers to the emphasis on qualitative improvements. What explains the continued proliferation of SS-9s and SS-11s? (Incidentally, I haven't been able to research all the references in your bibliography.) How does the bureaucratic muscle of the Strategic Rocket Forces compare with that of the Navy and does this help us understand the nature and possible limits of the ICBM and SLBM buildups?

3. The discussion on p. 23 refers to the internal debate over weapons priorities. Is there anything more I can read or learn about this subject?

I think it would be helpful to have this included on the NSSM-3 report along with any elaborations on it there are possible.

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